



Secure defaults developer-friendly security

Pieter De Cremer & Claudio Merloni

Who here has heard of secure defaults?

Who is already sold on this idea?

Secure defaults is **NOT** just...

Secure defaults is **NOT** just...

...having developers fix all security bugs

Secure defaults is **NOT** just...

...having developers fix all security bugs

...only fixing high priority issues

Secure defaults

make it **easy** to write **secure** code

make it **hard** to write **insecure** code

Dweilen met de kraan open

English: mopping while the tap is still running



Security researchers at Semgrep



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Claudio Merloni

p4p3r 



Early adopters are doing this already



Netflix

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HldexRqjpWc>



Meta / Facebook

<https://about.fb.com/news/2019/01/designing-security-for-billions/>



Microsoft

<https://www.acsac.org/2007/workshop/Howard.pdf>



Google

<https://sre.google/books/building-secure-reliable-systems/>



Snowflake

<https://semgrep.dev/blog/2021/appsec-development-keeping-it-all-together-at-scale>



Semgrep

<https://semgrep.dev/blog/2020/fixing-leaky-logs-how-to-find-a-bug-and-ensure-it-never-returns>

And many more

Secure defaults

WHY Security must scale

WHAT The secure way, the easy way

WHO Success stories

HOW Think long term, high impact

Secure defaults

WHY Security must scale

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Despite security automations, vulnerabilities are still prevalent

Every application

suffers from security issues throughout its lifetime


Underlying code

is where vulnerabilities lie, in most cases

Nothing new under the sun

as vulnerabilities evolve just slowly

Traditional security tools were designed to be part of software testing



The development team and security team historically had an adversarial relationship

Two separate worlds

with different priorities and perspectives

Not working in tandem

instead pushing around large lists of potential issues

No empathy, little collaboration

caught up in a system that doesn't scale

Modern development practices require security teams to adapt

Automation is a key element

to increase speed of finding and fixing vulnerabilities


Context switching kills productivity

and same goes for security outside of dev workflows


Testing speed is fundamental

to avoid friction and make security “seamless”


A shift-left movement is ongoing to address security earlier in development




Traditional security tools use a reactive approach




Traditional security tools use a reactive approach



Security teams should be enablers



With secure defaults
we can be more proactive



They should provide developers with
role-specific tools

Relevant

to the developer's work

Efficient

in meeting the developer's needs

Usable

and well-integrated into the developer's workflow

Don't just take our word for it

Owasp Top 10

"If we genuinely want to "move left" as an industry, we need more threat modeling, secure design patterns and principles, and reference architectures."

Owasp SAMM

Security Architecture - Level 2: "Direct the software design process toward known secure services and secure-by-default designs."

Secure defaults

WHY Security must scale

WHAT The secure way, the easy way

WHO Success stories


HOW Think long term, high impact

The security team is responsible for finding vulnerabilities in the software




1

AppSec



Security should become a **shared** responsibility



Shared responsibility means shared goals

Ship features fast

what developers care about

Prevent and fix vulnerabilities

what security people care about

Improving one at the detriment of the other
is not real improvement

Security is not special
Plan and scope it with the rest of the work

To make secure code more scalable, we can learn from the DevOps movement

Before: Operators responsible

developers throw finished code over the wall



After: Self-service deployment

with CI/CD pipeline and infrastructure as code




Eliminate bug classes one at a time


AppSec time spent



Eliminate bug classes one at a time



Example 1: secrets must be stored in AWS



Example 1: secrets must be stored in AWS


Python

```
response = client.get_secret_value(  
    SecretId='MyTestDatabaseSecret',  
)  
print(response)
```

Java

```
private final SecretCache cache = new SecretCache();  
  
@Override public String handleRequest(String secretId, Context c) {  
    final String secret = cache.getSecretString(secretId);  
    System.out.println(secret);  
}
```

Eliminate bug classes one at a time



Killing bug classes leads to compounding effects to leverage your time better

AppSec time spent




Example 2: queries must be parameterized

```
1 import java.sql.Connection;
2
3 public class WorkshopDemo{
4
5     public ResultSet getBeer(Connection conn, String beerName){
6         String query = "SELECT brand, brewery, alcohol, price FROM beer WHERE name = " + beerName;
7         Statement stmt = conn.createStatement();
8         ResultSet rs = stmt.executeQuery(query);
9         return rs;
10    }
11
12    public ResultSet getBeerSecurely(Connection conn, String beerName){
13        String query = "SELECT brand, brewery, alcohol, price FROM beer WHERE name = ?";
14        PreparedStatement stmt = conn.prepareStatement(query);
15        stmt.setString(beerName);
16        ResultSet rs = conn.executeQuery();
17        return rs;
18    }
19
20 }
```

Killing bug classes leads to compounding effects to leverage your time better

AppSec time spent




Example 3: no direct response writer

```
29 @WebServlet(value="/xss-04/BenchmarkTest02229")
30 public class BenchmarkTest02229 extends HttpServlet {
31
32     private static final long serialVersionUID = 1L;
33
34     @Override
35     public void doPost(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response)
36         throws ServletException, IOException {
37         response.setContentType("text/html;charset=UTF-8");
38
39         String results = doSomething(request.getParameter("param"));
40
41         response.setHeader("X-XSS-Protection", "0");
42         response.getWriter().printf("Results are: %s", results);
43     }
44 ..
```

Solution: Use framework like JavaServer Faces (JSF) instead

Killing bug classes leads to compounding effects to leverage your time better

AppSec time spent



Secure defaults

WHY Security must scale


WHAT The secure way, the easy way

WHO Success stories

HOW Think long term, high impact

59% of XSS vulnerabilities could have been prevented with secure defaults

Fraction of XSS vulnerabilities preventable with secure defaults



What does success look like?

Classes of security risk eliminated

Average time to find and fix reduced

Average severity reduced

Bug bounty costs reduced

How Netflix does secure defaults

[Netflix Culture Meets Product Security | by Bryan D. Payne | Medium](#)

[The Paved Road at Netflix](#)

[APPSEC Cali 2018 - We Come Bearing Gifts: Enabling Product Security](#)

[Scaling Appsec at Netflix. By Astha Singhal](#)

[AppSecCali 2019 - A Pragmatic Approach for Internal Security Partnerships](#)

[The Show Must Go On: Securing Netflix Studios At Scale](#)

[Scaling Appsec at Netflix \(Part 2\) | by Netflix Technology Blog](#)

How Netflix does secure defaults



In-house consulting

no long-term relationships, no clear priorities

Per-app assessment does not scale

actionable self-service is important

How Netflix does secure defaults



Context, not control

not required, recommended

Partnerships

invest in paved road together with the consuming team


How Netflix does secure defaults

1. Engagement Identification
2. Discovery meeting
3. Security Review
4. Alignment and Document priorities
5. Sync regularly

How Netflix does secure defaults

Missing or incomplete authentication


most critical type of issue they regularly faced



How Netflix does secure defaults

No organic adoption

until other features were added



How Netflix does secure defaults

Paved road simplifies reviews

are you using it or not?


Security was not the main motivation

the secure default allowed developers to move faster

How Meta / Facebook does secure defaults

Defense in Depth


Keeping Facebook safe requires a multi-layered approach to security



Defense in Depth


Secure frameworks to reduce programming errors
Automated testing tools to analyze code non-stop, automatically and at scale

How Snowflake does secure defaults



Unscalable security reviews
performed by security engineers


How Snowflake does secure defaults



Self-service threat modeling

by security partners
a big long questionnaire

How Snowflake does secure defaults




Self-service threat modeling

by security partners

Risk assessment

to determine if threat modeling can be skipped
6 questions to determine if it is Low, Med, or High risk

How Snowflake does secure defaults



Self-service threat modeling

by security partners


Risk assessment

to determine if threat modeling can be skipped

Security impact assessment

to filter “no security impact” work

How Snowflake does secure defaults



Self-service threat modeling

by security partners

Risk assessment

to determine if threat modeling can be skipped

Security impact assessment

to filter “no security impact” work

Project risk impact assessment

to manage timeline risk

How Snowflake does secure defaults

Never threat model the same thing twice

create re-usable secure defaults

Speed up reviews

block anti-patterns with Semgrep

How Semgrep does secure defaults



Self-service DevSec
without security team

Faster resolution
solved in minutes

Security can focus on high-impact work
not fixing devs latest XSS mistake

How Semgrep does secure defaults



Found tokens being logged

1. Mitigate
Revert logging change
2. The secure default
Replace `str` param with `ObfuscatedStr`
3. Enforcement

How Semgrep does secure defaults



3. Enforcement

Block commits to SQLAlchemy models for security review

Yearly training on the pitfalls of logging sensitive data

Audit logs weekly

File an issue with your SAST provider, demanding they add checks to catch sensitively logged data!

How Semgrep does secure defaults



3. Enforcement

~~Block commits to SQLAlchemy models for security review~~

~~Yearly training on the pitfalls of logging sensitive data~~

~~Audit logs weekly~~

~~File an issue with your SAST provider, demanding they add checks to catch sensitively logged data!~~

How Semgrep does secure defaults



3. Enforcement

Enforce an invariant with Semgrep

```
rules:
- id: obfuscate-sensitive-string-columns
  patterns:
  - pattern: |
    | $COLUMN = db.Column(db.String, ...)
  - metavariable-regex:
    | metavariable: $COLUMN
    | regex: '.*(?<![A-Za-z])(token|key|email|secret)(?![A-RT-Za-rt-z]).*'
  message: |
  | '$COLUMN' may expose sensitive information in logs and exceptions. Use
  | 'db.ObfuscatedString' instead of 'db.String'.
  severity: WARNING
```

Secure defaults

WHY Security must scale

WHAT The secure way, the easy way

WHO Success stories

HOW Think long term, high impact

Think long term,

think high impact



Think long term, high impact

1. Select vulnerability class
2. Build a scalable solution and make it the default
3. Measure adoption
4. Drive organic adoption

1. Select vulnerability class

AppSec time spent



Focus on best ROI

maximize impact, minimize ongoing time requirements

Reduce risk, ensure a baseline

don't try to find and fix every bug

Eliminate bug classes

find and prevent at scale for compound effect

1. Select vulnerability class

AppSec time spent



Focus on best ROI

maximize impact, minimize ongoing time requirements


Reduce risk, ensure a baseline

don't try to find and fix every bug

Eliminate bug classes

find and prevent at scale for compound effect

2. Build a scalable solution and make it the default



3. Measure adoption

Team Score

1



2



3



Track costs and fix time

per team and per bug class

Track adoption of secure defaults

speak to your “customers”

also provides friendly peer pressure

4. Drive organic adoption by productizing your secure defaults

Integrate into existing features

make the secure way, the easy way

Add non-security features

make it attractive to use

4. Drive organic adoption

Integrate into existing features

make the secure way, the easy way

Add non-security features

make it attractive to use

Automate checks

to observe, and to enforce adoption

An **effective false positive** is a marking where the developer chooses not to take action

False positive (FP)

security perspective
secure code marked as insecure

Effective False Positive (EFP)

developer perspective
any marking a developer won't fix

Drive adoption with better tools

Relevant

project-specific guidelines

Efficient

fast scan times, well-integrated

Usable


not just detect mistakes, but help with fixing

A relevant tool allows for customized rules

Customized rules



No customized rules



"Industry leading"



Semgrep allows for easy rule customization

```
1 rules:
2   - id: python-exec
3     pattern: exec(...)
4     message: Found use of banned function
5     severity: WARNING
6     languages:
7       | - python
```

```
1 # Use of exec() is completely banned. Find all calls to exec().
2
3 import exec as safe_function
4
5 # ruleid: python-exec
6 safe_function(user_input)
7
8 # ruleid: python-exec
9 exec()
10
11 # ruleid: python-exec
12 exec("ls")
13
14 # ruleid: python-exec
15 exec(foo)
16
17 # ruleid: python-exec
18 exec(
19     bar
20 )
21
22 # ruleid: python-exec
23 exec(foo, bar)
24
25 # ok: python-exec
26 some_exec(foo)
27
28 # ok: python-exec
29 # exec(foo)
30
```

Run ↵

6 matches


Semgrep v1.25.0 · in 0.4s · ✓ tests passed

A **relevant** tool uses customized rules



Customized rules 50% higher fix rate
compared to generally applicable rules

The tool should provide remediation guidance




The tool should provide remediation guidance

during assignment

when finished

Remediation
guidance




79% free of markings

Reduced **effective**
false positives!



No remediation
guidance



6% free of markings



Semgrep provides remediation guidance in the form of autofixes

```
1 rules:
2   - id: python-exec
3     pattern: exec($...CMD)
4     fix: safe_exec($...CMD)
5     message: Found use of banned function `exec($...CMD)`
6     severity: WARNING
7     languages:
8       - python
```

```
1 # Use of exec() is completely banned. Find all calls to exec().
2
3 import exec as safe_function
4
5 # ruleid: python-exec
6 safe_function(user_input)
7
8 # ruleid: python-exec
9 exec()
10
11 # ruleid: python-exec
12 exec("ls")
13
14 # ruleid: python-exec
15 exec(foo)
```

Run

Matches

↑ Line 6

Found use of banned function `exec(user_input)`

autofix

`safe_exec(user_input)`

Semgrep provides remediation guidance in the form of autofixes

```
demo » semgrep --config rule.yaml testcode.py
```

```
6 Code Findings
```

```
testcode.py
```

```
python-exec
```

```
Found use of banned function `exec(user_input)`
```

```
▶▶ | Autofix ▶ safe_exec(user_input)
```

```
6 | safe_function(user_input)
```

```
⋮ | -----
```

```
python-exec
```

```
Found use of banned function `exec()`
```

```
▶▶ | Autofix ▶ safe_exec()
```

```
9 | exec()
```

```
⋮ | -----
```

```
python-exec
```

```
Found use of banned function `exec("ls")`
```

```
▶▶ | Autofix ▶ safe_exec("ls")
```

```
12 | exec("ls")
```

```
⋮ | -----
```

Semgrep provides remediation guidance in the form of autofixes



semgrep-app bot reviewed yesterday

[View changes](#)

frontend/src/screens/deployment/findings/FindingsPanel.tsx Outdated

Hide resolved

```
559 +   prev.reposLoaded === next.reposLoaded &&
560 +   prev.filterItems === next.filterItems;
561 +
562 +   console.log({ areShallowEqual, propsAreEqual });
```



semgrep-app bot yesterday



Do not commit debugging console.log statements in code that is deployed.

Fix or ignore this finding to merge your pull request.

From `no_console_logs`.

Not helpful

Semgrep provides remediation guidance in the form of autofixes



Rules with autofix have 50% higher fix rate
compared to rules without autofix

Struggles and future work

Political and cultural resistance

the security team wants control

Code quality takes time away from features

markings are false positives

Siloed teams and persistent habits

no empathy or synergy, need for building partnerships

Secure defaults

WHY Security must scale

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WHO Success stories

HOW Think long term, high impact

Secure defaults is **NOT** just...

...having developers fix all security bugs

...only fixing high priority issues

Secure defaults is **NOT** just...

...having developers fix all security bugs
but **building scalable self-service solutions**
...only fixing high priority issues

Secure defaults is **NOT** just...

...having developers fix all security bugs
but **building scalable self-service solutions**

...only fixing high priority issues
but **killing high-impact bug classes**

TL;DR secure defaults

WHY Security must scale

speed of development has increased
security experts are understaffed

WHAT The secure way, the easy way
systematic fundamental solutions
productizing those solutions

WHO Early adopters have been successful
Netflix, Meta, Snowflake, Semgrep, and more

HOW Think long term, high impact
leverage your time most effectively now
to have big wins in the future
automate smart





Secure defaults developer-friendly security

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